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Abstract
Executive pay disparity, as measured by chief executive officer (CEO) pay slice (CPS), is
positively associated with the implied cost of equity, even after controlling for other deter-
minants of the cost of equity. The difference in the cost of equity can explain 43% of the
difference in the valuation effect attributable to CPS reported by Bebchuk, Cremers, and
Peyer (2011). Further analysis shows that the positive association is stronger when agency
problems of free cash flow are more severe and when CEO succession planning is more
important. Our evidence suggests that a large CPS is associated with CEO entrenchment
and high succession risk.
I. Introduction
After having focused on absolute pay commanded by corporate executives
for decades, investors, rating agencies, and regulators have begun to pay more
attention to pay disparity in the boardroom. Corporate governance advisor In-
stitutional Shareholder Services (ISS) lists internal pay equity as one of the key
considerations in executive pay (Ho and Epstein (2008)). Moody also sees a large
pay differential between the chief executive officer (CEO) and other senior exec-
utives as a red flag for credit risk (Moody (2006)). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires listed companies to disclose the
ratio of a CEO’s pay to the median pay of all other employees of the company.
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All of these indicate that executive pay disparity has become a hot issue, espe-
cially after the recent bailouts of financial companies, with their risk-taking be-
havior, to prevent them from collapsing in the face of the subprime mortgage
crisis.
In this paper, we investigate the association between executive pay disparity
and the cost of equity capital. Understanding the association is important because
the cost of capital is one of the key considerations for managers in their capital
budgeting and corporate financing decisions. In fact, the cost of capital is a more
direct yardstick of corporate investment and financing decisions than is firm val-
uation. A higher cost of capital means fewer positive net present value (NPV)
projects, leading to fewer growth opportunities. In addition, the cost of capital
summarizes an investor’s risk-return trade-off in his resource allocation decision
(Pa´stor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008)).
In general, there are two perspectives on executive pay disparity. The tourna-
ment perspective views the large pay gap between the CEO and other executives
as the prize for a tournament in which players compete for the CEO position
(Lazear and Rosen (1981), Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009)). A large pay
disparity motivates non-CEO senior executives to work hard and to invest in firm-
specific human capital. This, in turn, helps build a large pool of skilled internal
candidates for the CEO position. The availability of skilled internal candidates
not only reduces the entrenchment of the incumbent CEO by increasing the bar-
gaining power of the board, but it also reduces CEO succession risk. Therefore,
this perspective predicts a negative association between executive pay disparity
and the cost of capital.
On the other hand, the managerial power perspective (Bebchuk and Fried
(2003)) suggests that pay reflects the bargaining power of executives, and there-
fore a large pay disparity between the CEO and other senior executives indicates
an entrenched CEO. An entrenched CEO is associated with a more severe agency
problem during his tenure (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011)). In addition,
an entrenched CEO may obstruct succession planning, especially the grooming of
internal successor candidates, to further entrench himself (Rajan and Wulf (2006),
Masulis and Mobbs (2011)). This leads to high succession risk. As a result, the
managerial power perspective predicts a positive association between executive
pay disparity and the cost of capital.
Prior studies on pay disparity focus on the economic consequence of firm
value and performance. Kale et al. (2009) find a positive contemporaneous as-
sociation between executive pay disparity and firm value as well as accounting
performance. In contrast, Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that a large executive pay
inequity leads to lower future firm value and accounting performance. As a whole,
this line of research provides inconclusive evidence. Furthermore, since firm value
is determined by both the expected future cash flows and growth rates (the cash
flow effect) and the cost of capital (the discount rate effect), it is not clear from
the above findings if large executive pay disparity implies a higher cost of equity
capital.
A recent study by Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2009) finds that higher CEO
incentive pay is associated with lower future realized returns. They do not exam-
ine the relation between executive pay disparity and future stock returns directly.
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Moreover, they examine ex post realized returns. As pointed out by a number of
researchers (e.g., Elton (1999), Stulz (1999), Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan
(2001), and Pa´stor et al. (2008)), realized returns may not be an appropriate proxy
for a firm’s cost of equity capital. Realized returns not only capture the variations
in a firm’s cost of equity, they also reflect the variations in expected cash flows
and growth opportunities, the shocks to cash flows and growth opportunities, and
the shocks to the discount rates (Campbell (1991)). In this study, we rely on the
ex ante cost of equity implied in stock prices and analysts’ earnings forecasts.
Specifically, the ex ante cost of equity is computed as the internal rate of return
that equates the current stock price with the present value of all future cash flows
to common shareholders, or as the rate that the market implicitly uses to discount
all future cash flows (Gebhardt et al.). One important advantage of the implied
cost of equity models is that they explicitly control for cash flow and growth ef-
fects in order to separate the discount rate effect from a firm’s valuation (Hail and
Leuz (2006)). Pa´stor et al. analytically show that under plausible conditions, the
implied cost of equity is perfectly correlated with the conditional expected stock
return.
Using 13,454 firm-year observations in the United States from 1993 to 2007,
we provide evidence that is consistent with the managerial power perspective, but
inconsistent with the tournament perspective. Our main measure of executive pay
disparity is the relative CEO pay, or more specifically, the CEO pay slice (CPS)
used by Bebchuk et al. (2011), defined as the ratio of the total CEO pay to the
sum of the total pay of the top 5 executives. We find that executive pay disparity
has a significantly positive association with the implied cost of equity capital even
after controlling for firm characteristics that may affect the cost of equity capital.
The positive association is statistically robust to various model specifications and
alternative measures of the cost of equity and executive pay disparity. We conduct
a battery of robustness tests and conclude that the association is not likely to be
driven by biases due to the endogeneity of executive pay disparity. The association
is also economically significant. Based on the results of our baseline model, an
increase in CPS from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile increases the cost
of equity by 13.9 basis points (bp). Under reasonable assumptions, 43% of the
valuation effect due to CPS reported by Bebchuk et al. (2011) is attributable to
the difference in the cost of equity capital.
We then investigate to what extent the positive association is due to an agency
problem during the incumbent CEO’s tenure (i.e., the monitoring hypothesis) or
a lack of succession planning leading to a high succession risk (i.e., the succes-
sion risk hypothesis). The former argument predicts a more pronounced positive
association when monitoring is more important. The latter argument predicts a
stronger positive association when CEO succession planning is more important.
To test these predictions, we partition the sample by our proxies for the impor-
tance of monitoring and the importance of succession planning for a firm. We
then investigate how the association between CPS and the cost of equity varies
with these proxies.
We measure the importance of monitoring the incumbent CEO by the
severity of agency problems of free cash flow (Jensen (1986)). A firm with high
(low) operating cash flow and low (high) Tobin’s Q (a proxy for investment
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opportunities) is defined as having the most (least) severe agency problem of free
cash flow. Since Bebchuk et al. (2011) have shown that CPS is negatively associ-
ated with Tobin’s Q and future accounting performance, our partitioning variables
may suffer from an endogeneity bias. To mitigate this potential bias, we use resid-
ual Tobin’s Q (or residual operating cash flow) in the analysis, where the residual
comes from the regression of Tobin’s Q (or operating cash flow) on CPS.
We measure the importance of CEO succession planning by considering the
likelihood that the CEO will leave in the near future and the cost of hiring an ex-
ternal CEO successor. CEO succession planning is more important for a firm that
expects its incumbent CEO to leave in the near future but sees a relatively high
cost of hiring an external successor. We estimate a logit model of CEO turnover
to construct an ex ante measure of CEO turnover likelihood. To measure the cost-
liness of hiring an external successor, we rely on industry homogeneity (Parrino
(1997)). Industry homogeneity is computed as the industry mean value of the
partial correlation between a firm’s returns and industry returns, controlling for
the market returns. Firms operating in a homogenous industry are likely to adopt
similar production technologies and compete in similar product markets. There-
fore, the gap in firm-specific skills between the internal and external successors
is smaller in a more homogenous industry, resulting in a relatively lower cost of
hiring an external successor.
We find supportive evidence for both the monitoring and the succession risk
hypotheses. In particular, we find that the positive relation between CPS and the
cost of equity capital is more pronounced in firms with more severe agency prob-
lems of free cash flow (i.e., firms with high operating cash flow but low invest-
ment opportunities). We also find that the positive association is more pronounced
when CEO succession planning is more important (i.e., when firms operate in
a less homogenous industry and the ex ante likelihood of the CEO’s leaving is
higher).
Executive pay disparity is correlated with corporate governance (Bebchuk
et al. (2011)). In a robustness check, we control for the influence of corporate
governance on executive pay disparity by using residual executive pay disparity
in our analysis, where the residual comes from a regression of executive pay dis-
parity on a series of corporate governance-related variables that potentially affect
the cost of equity. We still find a positive relation between residual executive pay
disparity and the cost of equity, suggesting that executive pay disparity captures
additional information beyond the agency problem. Finally, uncertainty associ-
ated with a CEO turnover, as measured by the increases in stock return volatility
around the time of the CEO turnover, is significantly higher for firms with a larger
CPS before the turnover. The result provides further support for the hypothesis
that a large executive pay disparity indicates a high succession risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II develops the hy-
potheses. Section III describes the research design. Section IV investigates the
main effect of CPS on the cost of equity and presents the results of our robust-
ness tests. Section V examines the cross-sectional variation in the association
between CPS and the cost of equity. Section VI provides further analysis on
the effect of CPS after controlling for corporate governance mechanisms. Section
VII investigates the association between CPS and the change in volatility around
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CEO turnovers. Finally, Section VIII discusses the contributions and concludes
the paper.
II. Hypothesis Development
Executive pay disparity can be viewed from two perspectives. The 1st per-
spective views executive pay disparity as a reflection of the relative power be-
tween the CEO and other senior executives. We call this view the managerial
power perspective. A 2nd perspective, which we call the tournament perspective,
sees a large CEO pay disparity as a huge incentive for other senior executives to
compete for the CEO position (Lazear and Rosen (1981), Kale et al. (2009)). Both
hypotheses predict that CEO pay disparity can be related to the cost of equity.
While the managerial power hypothesis predicts a positive relation, the tourna-
ment hypothesis predicts a negative relation.
A. The Managerial Power Hypothesis
The managerial power hypothesis predicts that a larger CEO pay disparity
is related to a higher cost of equity because it is associated with more CEO en-
trenchment and a greater CEO succession risk. Under this perspective, an exces-
sively large pay disparity between the CEO and other senior executives suggests
the entrenchment of the incumbent CEO and a weak board (Bebchuk and Fried
(2003)). Consistent with this view, Bebchuk et al. (2011) show that a large CEO
pay disparity is associated with low CEO turnover sensitivity to performance.
A series of studies in agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) suggest that in-
vestors demand a higher rate of return for an entrenched CEO for reasons such as
a higher systematic risk due to overinvestment, inefficient merger and acquisition
decisions, higher monitoring cost, more severe information asymmetry, higher
estimation risk, and investors’ lower willingness to share the idiosyncratic risk.1
In addition, in order to remain firmly entrenched, the incumbent CEOs may
obstruct effective CEO succession planning. In particular, they may be unwill-
ing to groom high quality internal CEO successor candidates or may even hinder
the career development of subordinate managers (Rajan and Wulf (2006)). Poor
inside promotion opportunities push talented subordinate managers to seek out-
side opportunities and reduce the pool of skilled internal candidates. Consistent
with this notion, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) find that inside directors with high
ability are rare in firms with more entrenched CEOs. The lack of skilled internal
1Albuquerque and Wang (2008) and Garmaise and Liu (2005) suggest that entrenched managers
increase a firm’s systematic risk because they overinvest to gain private benefits. Bebchuk et al. (2011)
show that executive pay disparity is associated with inefficient merger and acquisition decisions.
According to Lombardo and Pagano (2002), investors need to pay higher monitoring costs to safe-
guard their payoffs when managers are entrenched, and these must be compensated for with a higher
required rate of return. To hide their opportunistic behavior, entrenched CEOs may engage in the
manipulation of financial reporting and disclosures (Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2008)),
which increases the cost of equity (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004)). Merton’s (1987)
incomplete market hypothesis suggests that if shareholders are unwilling to hold shares of firms with
entrenched CEOs (Ferreira and Matos (2008)), the idiosyncratic risk is shared by fewer investors, who
consequently demand a higher expected return.
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replacements for incumbent CEOs reduces the bargaining power of the boards and
further entrenches the incumbent CEOs. Furthermore, the lack of skilled internal
successor candidates increases CEO succession risk.
CEO succession is one of the most important and risky events during the life
of a company (Vancil (1987)), and it is not a rare event.2 CEO succession brings
large risks to a firm.3 Shareholders value effective succession planning that leads
to smooth CEO succession (Shen and Cannella (2003), Zhang and Rajagopalan
(2004)). Consistent with this notion, there is an increasing demand by investors
and also regulators for effective CEO succession planning.4 Grooming quality in-
ternal candidates is one of the most important planning tasks (Bower (2007)). It is
through this process that internal candidates obtain the necessary firm-specific
knowledge and skills (Vancil (1987), Hermalin and Weisbach (1988)). If subor-
dinate managers do not have enough opportunities to gain the relevant skills and
expertise needed for the CEO position, they will face a steep learning curve after
succession. Alternatively, the board is forced to conduct a risky and costly outside
search. Both lead to great succession risk. The above discussions lead to our
1st hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Under the managerial power hypothesis, executive pay disparity is
positively associated with the cost of equity capital.
B. The Tournament Hypothesis
The tournament hypothesis argues that a large pay gap between the CEO
and other senior executives may represent a huge incentive for those competing
for the CEO position (Lazear and Rosen (1981), Kale et al. (2009)). To run a firm,
a CEO requires firm-specific skills. However, developing these skills has no ben-
efits for subordinate managers with no intention to stay for the long term because
these skills become useless when they leave the firm. Thus, incentives must be
provided for subordinate managers to stay and develop these skills. In addition,
neither firm-specific skills nor the inputs needed to develop them are observable.
Taylor (1995) suggests that contracting cannot induce competitors to make un-
observable investments for the purpose of developing unobservable outputs, but a
2For example, Vancil (1987) shows that for the entire population of newly appointed CEOs in
the United States between 1960 and 1984, only 1/2 remained in the position after 6 years. A cursory
analysis of the ExecuComp data also suggests that on average about 10% of the firms covered by
ExecuComp experienced at least one CEO departure each year between 1993 and 2005. This suggests
that, in any given year, the unconditional probability of a CEO turnover for a typical firm in the next 5
years is about 60%.
3Selecting the wrong CEO can damage the organization as a whole and can cause a depletion of
talent at the top of the firm. CEO succession is also likely to be accompanied by significant disrup-
tion, instability, and uncertainty for employees and for a firm’s business strategies (Coyne and Coyne
(2007)). Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg (2005) find a significantly long-lived increase in share price
volatility following a CEO turnover.
4For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) now considers CEO succession a
key part of corporate risk management and recommends greater transparency and shareholder dis-
closure about the management of succession risk (McCool (2009)). Institutional investor LIUNA
(Laborers’ International Union of North America) filed proposals on CEO succession at more than
70 companies. Moody and Standard & Poor’s include succession planning factors in their credit
ratings.
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tournament wherein competitors compete for the top award can solve the problem.
Schwarz and Severinov (2010) also analytically show that a tournament for pro-
motion motivates contenders to invest in firm-specific skills. Consequently, a big
tournament prize helps build a large pool of quality internal CEO candidates and
reduces the risk associated with CEO succession.
In addition, a large pool of skilled internal candidates represents credible
replacements for the incumbent CEO. This increases the bargaining power of
the board and reduces the incentives of the incumbent CEO to behave oppor-
tunistically (Masulis and Mobbs (2011)). Furthermore, competition for the big
prize associated with the CEO position can induce inside successor candidates to
reveal their private information, which is necessary for the board to monitor the
CEO (Raheja (2005)). The previous discussions lead to our 2nd hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Under the tournament hypothesis, executive pay disparity is nega-
tively associated with the cost of equity capital.
C. Cross Variation in the Association between Executive Pay Disparity
and the Cost of Equity
The previous two perspectives also lead to different predictions on the con-
ditional association between CEO pay disparity and the cost of equity. The man-
agerial power perspective views a large pay disparity as a symptom of entrenched
CEOs, which suggests not only a severe agency problem during tenure but also
high succession risk due to poor succession planning. Therefore, this perspec-
tive predicts a more pronounced positive association between pay disparity and
the cost of equity when i) monitoring is more important, and ii) succession is
perceived as more urgent and it is more costly to find a suitable external CEO
successor.
The 1st prediction follows from Garmaise and Liu (2005), who show that
in the presence of information asymmetry, management control over investment
decisions increases the cost of equity more when managers are more dishonest.
Chen, Chen, and Wei (2011) further show empirical evidence that shareholders
demand a higher risk premium for firms with weak shareholder rights, when
the agency problem of free cash flow (Jensen (1986), Lang, Stulz, and Walk-
ling (1991)) is more severe (i.e., monitoring is more important). We follow Chen
et al. (2011) to use free cash flow to proxy for the demand for monitoring. For
the 2nd prediction, the likelihood of CEO succession in the near future matters
because identifying and grooming a skilled internal successor is a long process
(Bower (2007)). Parrino (1997) argues that the relative cost of having an outside
CEO successor is likely to be higher in less homogenous industries (i.e., industries
consisting of dissimilar firms). This is because firm-specific skills are important
for the successor CEO in running the firm. External successors will find it more
difficult to gain firm-specific skills if they are from firms that employ a dissimi-
lar technology and compete in a different product market. In addition, it is more
difficult to evaluate an outside candidate’s ability in a heterogeneous industry.
The tournament hypothesis, however, suggests that a large pay disparity
helps a firm to build a pool of possible internal CEO successors. A large pool
of skilled potential CEO replacements disciplines the incumbent CEO during
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his tenure and also reduces succession risk when he steps down. Therefore, one
should observe a more pronounced negative association between pay disparity
and the cost of equity under the previous two conditions. The above discussions
lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3 (The monitoring hypothesis). Under the managerial power (the tour-
nament) hypothesis, the positive (negative) association between executive pay dis-
parity and the cost of equity is more pronounced when the level of free cash flow
is higher and when fewer investment opportunities are available to the firm.
Hypothesis 4 (The succession risk hypothesis). Under the managerial power (the
tournament) hypothesis, the positive (negative) association between executive pay
disparity and the cost of equity is more pronounced if the CEO is more likely to
leave in the near future and if the firm operates in a more heterogeneous industry.
III. Research Design
A. Sample Selection
We collect all firm-year observations with complete data from the Execu-
Comp database from 1993 through 2007 to compute CEO pay disparity. We ex-
clude observations for year 1992, since ExecuComp’s coverage is incomplete for
that year. We delete financial institutions (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes from 6000 to 6999) and remove firm-year observations with no correspond-
ing data on the implied cost of equity, executive pay disparity, and the control
variables (defined later). The previous sample selection procedure results in a to-
tal of 13,454 firm-year observations for 2,187 firms over 44 industries defined by
Fama and French (1997).
B. Model Specification
We estimate the following regression to test our hypotheses.
COCi,t = α + bCPSi,t−1 + c1BETAi,t + c2IRISKi,t + c3LogMVi,t−1(1)
+ c4LogBMi,t−1 + c5LEVi,t−1 + c6MMTi,t + c7FERRi,t
+ c8FLTGi,t + Industry Fixed Effects
+ Year Fixed Effects + εi,t,
where COC is the cost of equity, measured as the implied cost of equity mi-
nus the risk-free rate. We follow Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Pa´stor et al. (2008)
to compute COC. The implied cost of equity is the internal rate of return that
equates the current stock price with the present value of all future cash flows to
common shareholders (Gebhardt et al.). The estimation procedure is detailed in
the Appendix. The risk-free rate is measured as the yield on 10-year Treasury
bonds. We follow Bebchuk et al. (2011) to use CPS, defined as the total CEO
pay (ExecuComp item TDC1) divided by the sum of the total pay of the top 5
executives, as our main measure of executive pay disparity. We require the CEO
to have served the company for at least a complete fiscal year. We also require
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firms to have complete total pay data in ExecuComp for at least 5 top executives.
When the total pay of more than 5 top executives is reported, we pick the 5 top
executives with the highest total pay.
We include 9 control variables that prior studies have found to affect COC.
Specifically, we control for market beta (BETA), idiosyncratic return volatility
(IRISK), firm size (LogMV), book-to-market ratio (LogBM), leverage (LEV), price
momentum (MMT), forecast errors (FERR), and long-term growth rates (FLTG).
We expect positive coefficients on BETA, LogBM (Fama and French (1992)),
IRISK (Merton (1987)), and LEV (Modigliani and Miller (1958)). We expect neg-
ative coefficients on LogMV (Fama and French (1992)), MMT (Guay, Kothari,
and Shu (2011)), and FERR (Hail and Leuz (2006)). We do not have predictions
on FLTG (Gebhardt et al. (2001)). We also control for industry effects by includ-
ing industry dummy variables based on the industries defined by Fama and French
(1997).5 Finally, we control for year fixed effects, as Bebchuk et al. (2011) have
found that CPS increases over time. The definitions of these variables are detailed
in the Appendix. Equation (1) is estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS)
method and by pooling all firm-year observations.
Since the implied cost of equity is a key variable in our study and its validity
is subject to debate (Easton and Monahan (2005)), we conduct a validity test
before proceeding. Specifically, we test the validity of our cost of equity estimate
using the 2-dimension tests proposed by Lee, So, and Wang (2010). Guay et al.
(2011) and Easton and Monahan suggest that after controlling for the cash flow
news and the discount rate news, a good estimate of the cost of equity should be
positively related to future realized returns. Lee et al. further suggest that under
very general assumptions, a good estimate of the cost of equity should predict not
only future realized returns but also the future cost of equity.
Panel A of Table 1 presents the results of our validity tests. We first test the
association between our COC measure and future stock returns, which is mea-
sured as the 12-month buy-and-hold returns (BHR12) starting from the month
after which COC is estimated. To do so, we run the OLS regression of BHR12
on COC using all observations in our sample. Following Lee et al. (2010), we
adjust the standard errors by clustering at both the firm and year levels. Column
1 in Panel A shows that the coefficient on COC is positive and significant at the
5% level (t-statistic = 2.30). Mohanram and Gode (2011) suggest that removing
predictable analysts’ forecast biases can significantly improve the quality of the
cost of equity estimate. Consistent with their conclusion, column 2 in Panel A
shows that the coefficient on COC becomes more significant (t-statistic = 4.72)
when we control for analyst forecast errors (FERR) in the regression. Column 3
shows that the current COC can reasonably predict the future COC. In particular,
the coefficient on COC is 0.716, which is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic =
17.43), and the adjusted R2 is 0.396, which is equivalent to a correlation of 0.63.
Thus, our cost of equity estimate seems reasonably valid in our sample period.
We repeat our tests using alternative measures of COC and obtain qualitatively
similar results.
5As a robustness test, we also use the lagged industry cost of equity to control for the industry
effect (Gebhardt et al. (2001)). The results are similar.
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TABLE 1
Validation Tests for the Implied Cost of Equity Measure and the Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 presents the OLS regression results of validity tests of the implied cost of equity. BHR12 is the 12-month
buy-and-hold returns starting from the month after the implied cost of equity is estimated. COCt+1 is the implied cost of
equity of the next ﬁscal year. The t-statistics are presented in parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for
clustering at both ﬁrm and year levels. Panel B reports the statistics of the key variables. COC is the cost of equity capital,
CPS is the CEO pay slice, BETA is the systematic risk, IRISK is the idiosyncratic risk, LogMV is the ﬁrm size, LogBM is
the book-to-market ratio, LEV is the leverage ratio, MMT is the momentum return, FERR is the analysts’ forecast error, and
FLTG is the analysts’ forecasted long-term growth rate. See the Appendix for detailed variable deﬁnitions.
Panel A. The Validation Test for the Implied Cost of Equity Measure
Dependent Variable
BHR12t+1 COCt+1
Independent Variable 1 2 3
COCt 0.021 0.039 0.716
(2.30) (4.72) (17.43)
Analyst forecast error (FERR) 0.032
(7.59)
Adj. R2 0.010 0.065 0.396
No. of ﬁrm-year obs. 12,063 12,063 11,956
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics
Percentile
No. of
Firm-Year
Variable Obs. Mean Stdev 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
COC (%) 13,454 4.288 2.570 1.167 2.608 4.152 5.839 7.541
CPS 13,454 0.374 0.115 0.237 0.308 0.373 0.439 0.511
Market beta (BETA) 13,454 1.080 0.705 0.309 0.592 0.960 1.416 2.015
Idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK) 13,454 1.360 1.431 0.280 0.487 0.891 1.649 2.987
Firm size (LogMV) 13,454 7.505 1.485 5.753 6.436 7.355 8.411 9.517
Book-to-market (LogBM) 13,454 −0.851 0.715 −1.751 −1.269 −0.801 −0.367 −0.022
Leverage (LEV) 13,454 0.191 0.152 0.000 0.048 0.186 0.297 0.388
Price momentum (MMT) 13,454 0.082 0.418 −0.392 −0.122 0.102 0.308 0.527
Analyst forecast error (FERR, %) 13,454 −1.006 4.513 −3.389 −1.060 −0.057 0.359 1.109
Long-term growth rate (FLTG, %) 13,454 15.576 10.804 7.000 10.000 14.250 19.000 25.000
IV. The Association between CPS and the Cost of Equity
A. Summary Statistics and Univariate Correlations
Panel B of Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our key variables. The
mean and median of COC are 4.288% and 4.152%, respectively, which are com-
parable with those reported in prior studies (e.g., Guay et al. (2011)). The mean
and median of CPS are 0.374 and 0.373, respectively, which are comparable to
those reported by Bebchuk et al. (2011). The median of firm size (MV) is $1,564
million, suggesting that our sample covers relatively large firms.
Table 2 presents the pairwise Spearman correlation matrix for the key vari-
ables in this study. The inference from the pairwise Pearson correlation (unre-
ported) is qualitatively similar. The univariate analysis shows that the result is
consistent with the managerial power hypothesis but inconsistent with the tour-
nament hypothesis. In particular, the correlation between CPS and COC is sig-
nificantly positive (coefficient = 0.032, p-value = 0.000). However, CPS is also
correlated with other determinants of COC. Therefore, the univariate analysis re-
sults may be misleading. We conduct formal regression analysis controlling for
other determinants of the implied cost of equity in the next section.
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TABLE 2
Univariate Correlations
Table 2 reports the Spearman correlation coefﬁcients and the corresponding p-values (in parentheses) for the key variables.
COC is the cost of equity capital, CPS is the CEO pay slice, BETA is the systematic risk, IRISK is the idiosyncratic risk,
LogMV is the ﬁrm size, LogBM is the book-to-market ratio, LEV is the leverage ratio, MMT is the momentum return, FERR
is the analysts’ forecast error, and FLTG is the analysts’ forecasted long-term growth rate. See the Appendix for detailed
variable deﬁnitions. The p-values in parentheses are used to test the null hypothesis that the correction is 0.
Variable Name COC CPS BETA IRISK LogMV LogBM LEV MMT FERR
CPS 0.032
(0.000)
Market beta (BETA) 0.091 −0.071
(0.000) (0.000)
Idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK) 0.305 −0.108 0.442
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm size (LogMV) −0.286 0.161 −0.113 −0.390
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Book-to-market (LogBM) 0.417 −0.018 −0.135 −0.081 −0.350
(0.000) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage (LEV) 0.059 0.084 −0.247 −0.211 0.046 0.306
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Price momentum (MMT) −0.333 0.041 −0.052 −0.003 0.107 −0.248 −0.052
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.728) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Analyst forecast error (FERR) −0.222 0.051 −0.046 −0.063 0.132 −0.098 −0.038 0.284
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Long-term growth rate (FLTG) −0.020 −0.134 0.412 0.531 −0.162 −0.410 −0.338 0.078 −0.041
(0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B. Regression Analysis
Table 3 reports the multivariate regressions of COC on CPS. Column 1
reports the results of the OLS regression, which is our baseline specification. We
adjust standard errors by clustering at the firm level.6 After controlling for market
beta (BETA), idiosyncratic return volatility (IRISK), firm size (LogMV), book-
to-market (LogBM), leverage (LEV), price momentum (MMT), earnings forecast
bias (FERR), long-term growth rate (FLTG), and industry and year effects, firms
with a larger CPS are found to have a significantly higher COC. The coefficient on
CPS is 0.509, which is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic= 2.94). The signs of
the coefficients for all control variables are consistent with prior literature. For
example, COC is positively associated with BETA, IRISK, LogBM, LEV, and
FLTG, and negatively associated with LogMV, MMT, and FERR.
We also investigate to what extent the results are driven by within- or cross-
firm variations. Column 2 reports the results from the firm fixed effects regression.
The firm fixed effects regression also serves as the 1st attempt to address the con-
cern of omitted correlated variables. To the extent that firm heterogeneity, which
determines CPS, is fixed over time, the firm fixed effects regression can effectively
6Petersen (2009) suggests that failing to control for over-time and cross-firm dependence may
result in the underestimation of standard errors in a panel data regression. We cluster standard errors
at the firm level and include year fixed effects to control for potential common shocks. We re-estimate
the OLS regression after clustering the standard errors at both the firm and year levels. The t-statistic
of the slope coefficient on CPS based on the 2-way clustered standard error is 3.57, so cross-firm
correlation should not be a concern in our sample.
860 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
TABLE 3
Executive Pay Disparity and the Implied Cost of Capital
Table 3 reports the results of the implied cost of capital (COC) regressed on executive pay disparity as measured by CPS.
CPS is the CEO pay slice, BETA is the systematic risk, IRISK is the idiosyncratic risk, LogMV is the ﬁrm size, LogBM is the
book-to-market ratio, LEV is the leverage ratio, MMT is the momentum return, FERR is the analysts’ forecast error, and FLTG
is the analysts’ forecasted long-term growth rate. See the Appendix for variable deﬁnitions. Column 1 reports the result from
the baseline OLS regression, column 2 from the ﬁrm ﬁxed effects regression, and column 3 from the Fama-MacBeth (1973)
regression. The t-statistics are in parentheses. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the ﬁrm level in columns 1 and 2 and for time-series serial correlation by the Newey and West (1987) method in column 3.
*, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Firm Fixed Effects Fama-MacBeth
OLS Regression Regression Regression
Independent Variable 1 2 3
CPS 0.509*** 0.308* 0.381***
(2.94) (1.67) (5.11)
Market beta (BETA) −0.012 −0.055 0.044
(−0.28) (−0.94) (0.48)
Idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK) 0.077*** 0.067* 0.146***
(3.01) (1.77) (3.35)
Firm size (LogMV) −0.225*** −0.018 −0.228***
(−9.71) (−0.22) (−4.57)
Book-to-market (LogBM) 1.457*** 1.089*** 1.418***
(23.45) (11.31) (27.02)
Leverage (LEV) 1.355*** 0.482 1.351***
(6.70) (1.61) (5.85)
Price momentum (MMT) −0.986*** −1.192*** −1.020***
(−18.43) (−21.76) (−6.25)
Analyst forecast error (FERR) −0.071*** −0.062*** −0.066***
(−12.47) (−9.35) (−7.91)
Long-term growth rate (FLTG) 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.009**
(3.86) (3.95) (2.42)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes No
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes No Yes
Firm ﬁxed effects No Yes No
Adj. R2 0.562 0.696 0.556
No. of ﬁrm-year obs. 13,454 13,454 13,454
eliminate biases due to omitted correlated variables. We find that the coefficient on
CPS (0.308) remains positive and is still significant at the 10% level (t-statistic =
1.67). Column 3 presents the results from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression.
We adjust the standard errors for the serial correlation as suggested by Newey
and West (1987). The coefficient on CPS (0.381) is still positive and significant at
the 1% level (t-statistic = 5.11). Thus, the positive association between CPS and
COC is driven by both within- and cross-firm variations. The results regarding the
control variables are in general consistent with those reported in column 1 using
the OLS regression.
The results in Table 3 are consistent with those of Bebchuk et al. (2011)
but inconsistent with those of Kale et al. (2009). That is, our empirical findings
support Hypothesis 1 but reject Hypothesis 2. Our evidence suggests that investors
view large executive pay disparity as a symptom of CEO entrenchment, but not
as a part of a tournament that is used to motivate non-CEO senior executives.
Looking at the economic significance, the estimated coefficient of CPS suggests
that an increase in CPS from the 10th percentile (0.237 in Table 1) to the 90th
percentile (0.511) is associated with an increase in the cost of equity of 13.9 bp,
other things being equal. Under reasonable assumptions, this difference in the cost
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of equity implies a difference of around 2.79% in firm value.7 Linking this result
to that of Bebchuk et al. (2011), the difference in the cost of equity accounts for
43% of the valuation difference associated with their CPS.8
C. Robustness Tests
1. The Endogeneity of CPS
The endogeneity of executive compensation has always been a major con-
cern in studies of the economic consequence of executive compensation. We have
made an attempt to address this issue in Table 3 by estimating the firm fixed
effects regression. In this section we conduct several additional robustness tests
to further address this concern.
Our 1st test attempts to check if our results are driven by reverse causality.
That is, does a higher cost of equity in the previous period drive a larger CPS?
To address this concern, we follow Chen et al. (2011) to include the lagged depen-
dent variable in our regression. Reverse causality can be ruled out to some extent
if the coefficient on CPS remains positive. The results are reported in column 1 of
Table 4. The evidence rules out reverse causality in this case, as the slope coeffi-
cient on CPS remains positive and significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 3.97)
even after including lagged COC in the regression. In addition, the magnitude of
the coefficient (0.484) is very close to that in our baseline OLS regression (0.509).
The results (unreported) are similar when we include COC lagged by 2 or 3 years.
Second, we estimate a change regression. Specifically, we regress the change
in COC (ΔCOC) against the change in CPS (ΔCPS), controlling for the changes
in all control variables, as well as industry and year fixed effects. Column 2 of
Table 4 reports the results. The sample size is reduced to 9,779 firm-year observa-
tions due to the extra data requirement. The coefficient onΔCPS (0.315) remains
positive and significant at the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.87). The magnitude is
close to that in the firm fixed effects regression but lower than that in the baseline
regression.
Third, we estimate a 2-stage least squares (2SLS) regression treating CPS
as endogenous. We adopt 2 extra instrumental variables for CPS: CPS lagged by
2 years and the industry median CPS. For each year, we compute the industry
median CPS as the median CPS of all firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry,
excluding the firm in question. Lagged CPS can be a valid instrument because it
is not likely to be affected by the cost of equity 3 years later. When industry fixed
7To see this, assume that a constant growth model holds and that the spread between the cost of
equity and the permanent earnings growth rate is no greater than 5%, that is, V = E/(R − g), where
V is firm value, E is the expected earnings in year 1, R is the cost of capital, and g is the earnings
growth rate. Denote VH (RH) and VL (RL) as the value (the cost of equity) of a firm with a high CPS
and that of a firm with a low CPS, respectively. Assume that both companies have the same E and g.
Then (VL − VH)/VH = (RH − RL)/(RH − g), RH − RL = 0.139%, and RH − g ≤ 5% suggest that
(VL − VH)/VH ≥ 2.79%.
8The coefficient on CPS in the Q-regression (column 1 of Table 4) in Bebchuk et al. (2011) is
–0.475. The mean value of Tobin’s Q in our sample is 1.998 (Bebchuk et al. do not report the mean
value of unadjusted Tobin’s Q). Therefore, an increase in CPS from the 10th percentile to the 90th
percentile will reduce the firm value by 0.475 × (0.511 – 0.237)/1.998 = 6.51%. This suggests that
the effect of the cost of equity accounts for 42.9% (2.79/6.51) of the valuation effect.
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TABLE 4
Robustness Tests for the Endogeneity of CPS
Table 4 reports regression results from robustness checks for the endogeneity of CPS. The dependent variable is the
implied cost of capital (COC) in columns 1 and 3, and it is the change in COC in column 2. CPS is the CEO pay slice,
BETA is the systematic risk, IRISK is the idiosyncratic risk, LogMV is the ﬁrm size, LogBM is the book-to-market ratio, LEV
is the leverage ratio, MMT is the momentum return, FERR is the analysts’ forecast error, FLTG is the analysts’ forecasted
long-term growth rate, and LagCOC is a 1-year lagged COC. The independent variables in column 2 are the changes in
the corresponding variables. See the Appendix for variable deﬁnitions. The t-statistics are in parentheses and are based
on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the ﬁrm level. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Controlling for the
Lagged Dependent Change 2SLS
Variable Regression Regression
Independent Variable 1 2 3
CPS 0.484*** 0.315* 1.121**
(3.97) (1.87) (2.21)
Market beta (BETA) 0.006 0.081 −0.083
(0.19) (1.33) (−1.63)
Idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK) 0.019 −0.129** 0.107***
(1.06) (−2.08) (3.13)
Firm size (LogMV) −0.071*** 0.422*** −0.212***
(−4.93) (3.98) (−8.00)
Book-to-market (LogBM) 0.652*** 0.656*** 1.484***
(13.45) (5.35) (20.72)
Leverage (LEV) 0.461*** 0.026 1.430***
(3.62) (0.09) (6.06)
Price momentum (MMT) −1.737*** −1.518*** −1.011***
(−32.26) (−31.61) (−14.88)
Analyst forecast error (FERR) −0.054*** −0.093*** −0.065***
(−9.14) (−13.12) (−9.20)
Long-term growth rate (FLTG) 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.014***
(6.30) (5.97) (4.82)
Previous year’s cost of equity (LagCOC) 0.476***
(32.03)
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.680 0.422 0.567
No. of ﬁrm-year obs. 12,908 9,779 8,854
effects are included in the cost of equity regression, industry CPS is not likely to
affect the cost of equity either. Due to the additional data requirements, the sample
size is further reduced to 8,854 firm-year observations.
Before presenting the 2SLS regression results, we first discuss the validity
of the 2 instrumental variables. Unreported results indicate that the 2 instruments
are jointly correlated with CPS. The Shea’s partial R2 of the 2 instruments in the
1st-stage regression is 0.156 (p-value < 0.0001). Formal tests reject the redun-
dancy of each individual instrument. The Hansen J-statistic for the overidentifi-
cation test of all instruments is 1.619 (p-value = 0.203), which fails to reject the
null hypothesis that all instruments are exogenous. Column 3 of Table 4 shows
that the estimate of the coefficient on CPS in the 2SLS regression is 1.121, and
it is significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = 2.21). Finally, we conduct a Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test to determine the endogeneity of CPS. The test technically fails
to reject the null hypothesis that CPS is exogenous (χ2=2.527, p-value= 0.112).
We thus conclude that although CPS is a firm choice variable, the evidence
from a series of robustness tests suggests that the positive association between
CPS and the cost of equity is not likely to be driven by endogeneity bias.
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2. Alternative Estimates of the Cost of Equity
The estimates of firm-specific implied cost of equity that rely on analysts’
earnings forecasts may have two drawbacks. One is that analysts’ forecasts with
systematic optimistic biases are used to proxy for investors’ earnings expecta-
tion. The other is that simplified assumptions have to be made for the perpetual
growth rate (i.e., the growth rate beyond the explicit forecast horizon). If the vari-
able in question (i.e., CPS) is correlated with measurement errors in earnings
expectations and perpetual growth rates, the results can be spurious. We have
explicitly controlled for analysts’ earnings forecast errors (FERR) and long-term
growth rates (FLTG) in regression (2). In this section, we conduct 2 further tests to
address this concern.
Before we conduct formal robustness tests, we calculate the correlation be-
tween CPS and analysts’ forecast errors for earnings per share (EPS) in year t + 1.
As shown in Table 2 earlier, the correlation between CPS and FERR is 0.051,
suggesting that analysts’ earnings forecasts are less optimistic for the firms with a
larger CPS.9 We also calculate the correlation between CPS and analysts’ forecast
errors for EPS in year t + 2 to year t + 5, and the results (unreported) are the same.
If investors are rational in incorporating CPS into their earnings expectations but
analysts are less so, the above results suggest that the estimates of the cost of
equity are less upward biased for firms with a larger CPS. This implies that the
confounding factors due to analysts’ forecast biases, if any, bias against our find-
ings. Nevertheless, we conduct another robustness test using the portfolio-level
cost of equity estimates suggested by Easton and Sommers (2007). This approach
uses realized earnings to proxy for investors’ expectations and therefore should
not suffer from analysts’ forecast biases. In addition, it estimates the cost of equity
and the perpetual growth rate simultaneously so that no firm-specific assumptions
on the perpetual growth rate need to be made.
Specifically, in each year from 1993 to 2007, we sort all firms into 10 equal-
sized portfolios based on CPS. We then compute the average cost of equity for
each portfolio following Easton and Sommers (2007). We are able to obtain 150
portfolio-year observations. We use both future- and current-year realized earn-
ings to proxy for investors’ expectations. We then estimate the regression
COCp,t = α + bCPSp,t−1 + c1BETAp,t + c2IRISKp,t(2)
+ c3LogMVp,t−1 + c4LogBMp,t−1 + c5LEVp,t−1
+ c6IndCOCp,t + Year Fixed Effects + εi,t,
where COCp,t is the cost of equity for CPS-sorted portfolio p in year t; and
CPSp,t−1, BETAp,t, IRISKp,t, LogMVp,t−1, LogBMp,t−1, and LEVp,t−1 are, re-
spectively, the mean values of CPS, BETA, IRISK, LogMV, LogBM, and LEV
of portfolio p in year t or t − 1. Since the cost of equity is estimated based on
portfolios and each portfolio consists of firms from different industries, we are
9Note that FERR is computed as actual EPS minus forecasted EPS. A high value of FERR indicates
low optimism.
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not able to control for industry fixed effects. To control for the industry effect,
however, we first compute the Easton and Sommers estimates of the cost of eq-
uity each year for each of the 48 industries defined by Fama and French (1997).
IndCOC is the portfolio’s weighted average industry cost of equity, where the
weight is the number of firms belonging to an industry. Since the estimated cost
of equity does not depend on analysts’ forecasts, we do not control for MMT,
FERR, or FLTG, the 3 variables that are correlated with forecast properties.
The results are reported in Table 5. Expected earnings are proxied by fu-
ture realized earnings in column 1 and by current realized earnings in column 2.
Consistent with Table 3, the coefficient on CPS is positive and significant at the
1% level in both models. Thus, the positive relation between CPS and the cost
of equity is not likely to be driven by measurement errors in analysts’ forecasts
and perpetual growth rates. However, in contrast to Table 3, the control variables
in both models are mostly insignificant. This might be because firms are grouped
TABLE 5
Regression Results from Using Alternative Cost of Equity Estimates
Table 5 reports the regression results from using alternative cost of equity estimates. The dependent variable is COCES,F
in column 1, COCES,C in column 2, and COCVL in column 3. CPS is the CEO pay slice, BETA is the systematic risk, IRISK
is the idiosyncratic risk, LogMV is the ﬁrm size, LogBM is the book-to-market ratio, LEV is the leverage ratio, MMT is the
momentum return, FERR is the analysts’ forecast error, FLTG is the analysts’ forecasted long-term growth rate, and IndCOC
is the portfolio’s weighted average industry cost of equity, where the weight is the number of ﬁrms belonging to an industry.
See the Appendix for detailed variable deﬁnitions. The t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on standard errors
adjusted for heteroskedasticity in columns 1 and 2, and adjusted for clustering at the ﬁrm level in column 3. *, **, and ***
indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Portfolio-Level Cost of Equity Estimates Based on
Easton and Sommers (2007)
Using Future Earnings to Using Current Earnings to
Proxy for Investors’ Proxy for Investors’ Using the Value Line Cost
Expectations, COCES,F Expectations, COCES,C of Equity Estimate, COCVL
Independent Variable 1 2 3
CPS 4.204*** 3.647*** 1.658**
(3.79) (2.86) (2.08)
Market beta (BETA) −4.019*** −1.860 0.678***
(−3.03) (−0.95) (3.03)
Idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK) 107.887 25.538 0.577***
(1.34) (0.32) (4.47)
Firm size (LogMV) −0.189 0.516 −0.139*
(−0.30) (0.82) (−1.65)
Book-to-market (LogBM) −3.756** −3.453* 0.761***
(−1.94) (−1.78) (4.23)
Leverage (LEV) 9.234 6.166 3.925***
(1.36) (0.98) (5.27)
Price momentum (MMT) −5.939***
(−22.39)
Analyst forecast error (FERR) −0.378***
(−10.15)
Long-term growth rate (FLTG) 0.021*
(1.84)
Industry cost of equity (IndCOC) 0.417** 0.481
(1.97) (1.29)
Industry ﬁxed effects No No Yes
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.506 0.626 0.321
No. of ﬁrm-year obs. 150 150 7,553
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into portfolios based on CPS in order to maximize the testing power. As a conse-
quence, variations in the control variables across the portfolios might not be large
enough for their effects to be detected. This is one limitation of the portfolio-
based cost of equity estimates. The test might be less efficient because firm-level
information is lost in the portfolio aggregation process (Dhaliwal, Krull, Li, and
Moser (2005)).
We next use the cost of equity estimate provided by Value Line, an invest-
ment research company, to repeat our baseline model. Unlike the portfolio-level
cost of equity estimates, the Value Line cost of equity estimates enable us to
exploit firm-level information. Furthermore, Value Line provides firm-specific
estimates of future dividends per share and future target prices so that we do
not need to make any assumptions on earnings growth beyond the explicit fore-
cast horizons. Therefore, measurement errors associated with those assumptions
can be eliminated. However, Value Line has a much smaller coverage compared
with the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) database and may have
a potentially serious sample selection problem (Ogneva, Subramanyam, and
Raghunandan (2007)). The results are reported in column 3 of Table 5. The coef-
ficient on CPS is still positive and significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = 2.08).
The signs of the control variables are in general consistent with those reported in
Table 3.
To summarize, the evidence in Table 5 as a whole suggests that the positive
association between CPS and the cost of equity is robust to alternative cost of
equity estimates.
3. Alternative Estimates of Executive Pay Disparity
Finally, we test whether the inference in Table 3 is sensitive to alterna-
tive measures of executive pay disparity used in prior studies. Table 6 reports
the results. First, we repeat our baseline model using the logarithm of total pay
gap (PAYGAP) used by Kale et al. (2009). PAYGAP is defined as the logarithm
of the difference between the total compensation awarded to the CEO and the
median value of the total compensation awarded to the other 4 top executives.
The results are reported in column 1 of Table 6. Column 2 uses the coefficient
of variation (CV) calculated from the total pay of each of the top 5 executives
(CV TOP5). Column 3 uses the Gini coefficient computed from the total pay of
each of the top 5 executives (GINI TOP5). All proxies of executive pay disparity
show a significant and positive association with the cost of equity. Bebchuk et al.
(2011) show that CPS and the Gini coefficient based on the other 4 top executives
(GINI TOP4) have opposite impacts on firm value and future accounting perfor-
mance. We then check whether they have different associations with the cost of
equity. Column 4 gives the results. We find that after controlling for GINI TOP4,
CPS is still significantly and positively associated with the cost of equity (coeff.=
0.553, t-statistic = 3.14). GINI TOP4 also shows a positive association with the
cost of equity and is significant at the 10% level (coeff. = 0.362, t-statistic =
1.83).
To summarize, the positive association between executive pay disparity and
the cost of equity is also robust to alternative measures of executive pay disparity.
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TABLE 6
Regression Results from Using Alternative Measures of Executive Pay Disparity
Table 6 reports the regression results from using alternative measures of executive pay disparity. The dependent variable
is COC. PAYGAP is the difference between the total pay of the CEO and the median total pay among the other top 4 exec-
utives. CV TOP5 is the coefﬁcient of variation based on the total pay awarded to each of the top 5 executives. GINI TOP4
(GINI TOP5) is the Gini coefﬁcient based on the total pay awarded to each of the top 4 (5) executives, CPS is the CEO pay
slice, BETA is the systematic risk, IRISK is the idiosyncratic risk, LogMV is the ﬁrm size, LogBM is the book-to-market ratio,
LEV is the leverage ratio, MMT is the momentum return, FERR is the analysts’ forecast error, and FLTG is the analysts’
forecasted long-term growth rate. See the Appendix for detailed variable deﬁnitions. The t-statistics are in parentheses
and are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the ﬁrm level. *, **, and *** indicate
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Independent Variable 1 2 3 4
PAYGAP 0.097***
(4.69)
CV TOP5 0.182**
(2.46)
GINI TOP5 0.489**
(2.53)
CPS 0.553***
(3.14)
GINI TOP4 0.362*
(1.83)
Market beta (BETA) −0.003 −0.013 −0.013 −0.012
(−0.07) (−0.32) (−0.32) (−0.30)
Idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK) 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.075***
(2.78) (2.92) (2.91) (2.93)
Firm size (LogMV) −0.276*** −0.226*** −0.227*** −0.228***
(−10.59) (−9.79) (−9.83) (−9.86)
Book-to-market (LogBM) 1.449*** 1.459*** 1.459*** 1.458***
(23.09) (23.45) (23.45) (23.45)
Leverage (LEV) 1.309*** 1.366*** 1.367*** 1.352***
(6.43) (6.76) (6.76) (6.69)
Price momentum (MMT) −1.011*** −0.978*** −0.978*** −0.983***
(−17.88) (−18.23) (−18.22) (−18.34)
Analyst forecast error (FERR) −0.068*** −0.071*** −0.071*** −0.071***
(−11.38) (−12.48) (−12.48) (−12.48)
Long-term growth rate (FLTG) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(3.70) (3.79) (3.78) (3.82)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm ﬁxed effects No No No No
Adj. R2 0.580 0.562 0.562 0.562
No. of ﬁrm-year obs. 12,799 13,454 13,454 13,454
V. Cross Variation in the Association between CPS
and the Cost of Equity
In this section, we formally test Hypotheses 3 and 4, which predict cross-
sectional variations in the association between CPS and COC. Hypothesis 3 pre-
dicts a more pronounced association when the agency problem of free cash flow
is more severe (i.e., when monitoring is more important). Hypothesis 4 predicts
a stronger association if CEO succession is to occur sooner rather than later
and if the comparative advantage of hiring an inside CEO successor is higher.
Testing the cross-sectional predictions serves two purposes. First, if we can pro-
vide evidence consistent with prior theoretical predictions, the concern of missing
correlated variables is further reduced. Second, cross-sectional variations in the
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association can help us understand the particular mechanisms through which CPS
is associated with the cost of equity.
A. Agency Problem of Free Cash Flow
To test Hypothesis 3, we follow Chen et al. (2011) and measure the agency
problem of free cash flow using operating cash flow and investment opportunities.
Operating cash flow (CF) is defined as net cash flow from operating activities,
and investment opportunities are defined as Tobin’s Q. Definitions of variables
are detailed in the Appendix. As a sensitivity check, we also measure investment
opportunities by sales growth (SGRW), defined as the ratio of sales in the current
year to sales in the prior year. The results (unreported) are similar. To alleviate the
concern that the results may be driven by the endogenous relation between CPS
and the free cash flow problem, we regress Q or CF on CPS, and we use residual
Q (denoted as RQ) or residual CF (denoted as RCF) to partition our sample (Chen
et al. (2011)).
Firms are independently sorted into 2 equal-sized groups (low and high)
based on residual CF (RCF), and another 2 equal-sized groups (again low and
high) based on residual Q (RQ). Firms with high RCF and low RQ are likely
to have the most serious agency problem associated with free cash flow. Firms
with low RCF and high RQ are likely to have the least severe agency problem.
The severity of the agency problem associated with free cash flow for firms in the
other 2 portfolios falls somewhere in the middle. We use these 2 portfolios as the
benchmark.
We then allow CPS to interact with the indicator variable for the high and
low free cash flows.10 Column 1 of Panel A in Table 7 gives the regression results.
We find that the coefficient on CPS (b0) is 0.592, which is significant at the 1%
level (t-statistic= 2.93), suggesting a positive association between CPS and COC
for the 2 benchmark portfolios. The coefficient on CPS × High free cash flow
(b1) is 0.918, which is significant at the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.85). The null
hypothesis that b0 + b1 = 0 is rejected at the 1% level (F-statistic = 10.40,
p-value= 0.001), suggesting a highly significant and positive association between
CPS and COC when the agency problem of free cash flow is most severe and
monitoring is most important. The magnitude of b0 +b1 is 1.51, suggesting that an
increase in CPS from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile is associated with
an increase in the cost of equity of 41.4 bp ((0.592 + 0.918)× (0.511− 0.237)),
or a difference of 8.28% (41.4 bp/5.00%) in firm value for the high free cash flow
portfolio. On the other hand, the coefficient on CPS × Low free cash flow (b2)
is −0.205 (t-statistic = −0.49), and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
10As a robustness test, we create a 3rd indicator variable for firms with high residual Q and also high
residual CF, and we use firms with low residual CF and low residual Q as the benchmark. The results
(not reported) are essentially the same. Specifically, the coefficient on CPS is still significantly higher
in the high free cash flow portfolio than in the low free cash flow portfolio. In addition, there is no
significant difference between the coefficient on CPS in the high residual Q, high residual CF portfolio
and that in the low residual Q, low residual CF portfolio. We therefore combine the 2 portfolios into
one and use it as the benchmark.
868 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
b0 + b2= 0 at the 10% level (F-statistic = 1.01, p-value = 0.3154). This indicates
that investors do not discount firms with a large CPS when the agency problem
of free cash flow is low. The difference between b1 and b2 is significant at the
10% level (F-statistic = 3.38, p-value = 0.066), consistent with the managerial
power hypothesis but inconsistent with the tournament hypothesis regarding the
monitoring role associated with CPS (Hypothesis 3).
TABLE 7
Cross Variation in the Association between CPS and the Cost of Equity
Panel A of Table 7 reports the regression results of the cost of equity capital (COC) on CEO pay slice (CPS) by taking
into account the agency problem and CEO succession risk. Panel B reports test statistics. High free cash ﬂow (Low free
cash ﬂow) is a dummy variable for ﬁrms with above (below) median residual cash ﬂow and below (above) median residual
Tobin’s Q. High CEO succession planning importance (Low CEO succession planning importance) is a dummy variable
for ﬁrms with above (below) median CEO leaving probability (PrLEAVE) and below (above) median industry homogeneity
(HOMOG). BETA is the systematic risk, IRISK is the idiosyncratic risk, LogMV is the ﬁrm size, LogBM is the book-to-
market ratio, LEV is the leverage ratio, MMT is the momentum return, FERR is the analysts’ forecast error, and FLTG is
the analysts’ forecasted long-term growth rate. See the Appendix for detailed variable deﬁnitions. The t-statistics are in
parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the ﬁrm level. *, **, and
*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Regression Results
Independent Variable Coefﬁcient 1 2 3
High free cash ﬂow −0.004 −0.009
(−0.02) (−0.05)
Low free cash ﬂow −0.536*** −0.525***
(−3.11) (−3.05)
High CEO succession planning importance −0.236 −0.216
(−1.60) (−1.49)
Low CEO succession planning importance 0.216 0.210
(1.35) (1.32)
CPS b0 0.592*** 0.494** 0.550**
(2.93) (2.19) (2.24)
CPS× High free cash ﬂow b1 0.918* 0.923*
(1.85) (1.86)
CPS× Low free cash ﬂow b2 −0.205 −0.227
(−0.49) (−0.55)
CPS× High CEO succession planning importance b3 0.412 0.382
(1.13) (1.07)
CPS× Low CEO succession planning importance b4 −0.363 −0.383
(−0.93) (−0.98)
Market beta (BETA) −0.061 −0.096** −0.059
(−1.40) (−2.14) (−1.36)
Idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK) 0.099*** 0.086*** 0.100***
(3.88) (3.29) (3.92)
Firm size (LogMV) −0.224*** −0.228*** −0.219***
(−9.49) (−9.32) (−9.17)
Book-to-market (LogBM) 1.347*** 1.420*** 1.356***
(21.77) (22.63) (21.69)
Leverage (LEV) 1.651*** 1.506*** 1.656***
(7.97) (7.20) (8.00)
Price momentum (MMT) −1.017*** −1.061*** −1.035***
(−18.42) (−18.90) (−18.69)
Analyst forecast error (FERR) −0.072*** −0.071*** −0.072***
(−11.08) (−10.95) (−11.08)
Long-term growth rate (FLTG) 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.013***
(4.57) (3.63) (4.55)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.583 0.555 0.563
No. of ﬁrm-year obs. 10,669 10,669 10,669
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 7 (continued)
Cross Variation in the Association between CPS and the Cost of Equity
Panel B. Hypothesis Testing
F-Statistic
(p-value)
Null Hypothesis 1 2 3
CPS + CPS× High free cash ﬂow = 0 (b0 + b1 = 0) 10.40 9.24
(0.001) (0.002)
CPS + CPS× Low free cash ﬂow = 0 (b0 + b2 = 0) 1.01 0.65
(0.315) (0.419)
CPS× Low free cash ﬂow = CPS× High free cash ﬂow 3.38 3.54
(b1 = b2) (0.066) (0.060)
CPS + CPS× High CEO succession planning importance = 0 7.98 7.75
(b0 + b3 = 0) (0.005) (0.005)
CPS + CPS× Low CEO succession planning importance = 0 0.14 0.22
(b0 + b4 = 0) (0.713) (0.638)
CPS× Low CEO succession planning importance = 2.70 2.69
CPS× High CEO succession planning importance (b3 = b4) (0.101) (0.101)
The previous finding is consistent with that of Chen et al. (2011) that share-
holders charge a higher risk premium for firms with weak shareholder rights when
the agency problem of free cash flow is more severe. The evidence is also con-
sistent with that of Bebchuk et al. (2011), that firms with a large CPS make less
profitable acquisitions. In terms of the economic significance, the magnitude of
the difference in the coefficient on CPS between the portfolio with high cash flow
(b1) and the portfolio with low free cash flow (b2) is 1.123. This difference sug-
gests that when the severity of a firm’s agency problem of free cash flow increases
from among the lowest to among the highest, the difference in the cost of equity
associated with the difference in CPS between the 10th and 90th percentiles is
increased by 30.5 bp ((0.918 + 0.205) × (0.511 – 0.237)). This difference in the
cost of equity implies an increase in the valuation effect of 6.1% (30.5 bp/5.00%).
B. The Importance of CEO Succession Planning
To test Hypothesis 4, we need a measure of the CEO turnover likelihood and
a measure of the relative cost of hiring an external CEO successor versus an in-
ternal CEO successor. We take a 2-step approach to measure the likelihood of a
future CEO turnover. In the 1st step, for each year, we estimate a logit regression
to predict a CEO turnover in the next 3 years. We choose a 3-year horizon, since
grooming a quality internal successor candidate is a long process (Bower (2007)).
However, our results are not sensitive to whether a CEO turnover is predicted for
the next 1, 2, or 3 years. We include the following predictors based on the prior
literature: the level of and the change in return on assets (ROA) (Parrino (1997),
Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004)), current and lagged market-adjusted stock
returns (Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988)), volatility of ROA, systematic volatil-
ity and idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns (Bushman, Dai, and Wang (2010)),
firm size, a CEO age dummy variable indicating if the age of the incumbent CEO
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is greater than or equal to 60 (Brickley (2003)),11 and the change in institutional
holding (Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003)). All of the predictors are measured at
the current year.
In the 2nd step, for each year t, we use the predictors measured at year t
and the coefficient estimates from the model estimated at year t − 3 to construct
an ex ante measure of the CEO leaving probability (PrLEAVE) in year t + 1 to
year t + 3. This approach ensures that the measure of CEO leaving likelihood is
based on information available to investors. In addition, our model incorporates
both the determinants of a forced CEO turnover and a voluntary CEO turnover.
The predictions are correct 65% of the time when we use the ex ante CEO turnover
probability to predict actual CEO turnover in the next 3 years using the holdout
sample. When we partition the firms into 2 groups based on the annual median
estimated probability, the actual CEO turnover frequency for the high probability
group is 0.408, and it is 0.204 for the low probability group. This suggests that
the model has reasonable predictive power in the holdout sample.
We then measure the relative cost of hiring an outside CEO successor us-
ing industry homogeneity as suggested by Parrino (1997). For each firm-year ob-
servation, we estimate the partial correlation between firm returns and industry
returns, controlling for the market returns from the past 60 (with a minimum of
36) monthly returns until the end of the current fiscal year. Industry returns are
the mean monthly returns of all firms in the same industry as defined by Fama
and French (1997). Then, for each industry year, we compute the industry ho-
mogeneity (HOMOG) as the mean partial correlation coefficient of all firms in
the industry. Excluding firms not covered by ExecuComp does not qualitatively
affect the results. The central rationale behind this measure is that if firms in an
industry employ similar production technologies and compete in similar product
markets, news concerning technological innovations or changes in the economic
environment will tend to affect their stock prices in a similar manner (Parrino).12
We first partition firm-year observations into 2 groups based on whether the
estimated CEO leaving probability (PrLEAVE) is above the within-year median
value. Firms are also independently sorted into 2 groups based on the within-year
median value of industry homogeneity (HOMOG). Thus, the 2-way sorts clas-
sify firms into 4 portfolios. The benefit of having skilled inside CEO candidates is
11Murphy (1999) finds that the likelihood of a CEO leaving office during a given year is about 30%
higher when the CEO is over the age of 64. Since our model is used to predict whether the CEO will
leave office within the next 3 years, we set the age cutoff at 60. Our results are not sensitive to whether
we use 60 or 64 as the cutoff.
12Industry homogeneity may capture just one dimension of the cost of hiring an external CEO
successor. To the extent that there are other important dimensions, this ex ante measure may result
in low testing power. Alternatively, one could measure the costs by observing the outcome of CEO
succession. In particular, industries with high external hiring costs should have more internal CEO
successors. The outcome-based approach has the advantage of capturing all dimensions of external
hiring costs. However, this measure may also capture CEO succession determinants other than ex-
ternal hiring costs. Thus, which variable provides higher testing power is an empirical question. We
repeat our analyses in Tables 7 and 8 by replacing industry homogeneity (HOMOG) with the industry
percentage of internal CEO successors (see Table 3 in Cremers and Grinstein (2011)). We obtain re-
sults that are qualitatively similar but less significant compared with those in Table 7 but do not find
results similar to those in Table 8.
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likely to be higher for firms with a higher CEO leaving likelihood and
operating in less homogenous industries. CEO succession for these firms is more
likely, so that less time remains for them to nurture skilled inside successor candi-
dates from scratch. In addition, the risk of hiring an incompetent outside CEO is
higher because of higher information asymmetry and his inevitable lack of firm-
specific knowledge. To summarize, CEO succession planning is most important
for these firms. On the other hand, the benefit of having a good inside CEO can-
didate pool is likely to be lower for firms with a low CEO leaving probability and
operating in a more homogenous industry. In other words, CEO succession plan-
ning is relatively less important. The importance of CEO succession planning is
somewhere in the middle for firms in the other 2 portfolios.
We then allow CPS to interact with the indicator variable for high CEO
succession planning importance and that for low CEO succession planning
importance, using the other 2 portfolios combined as the benchmark. Column 2 in
Table 7 reports the results. The coefficient on CPS (b0) is positive and significant
at the 5% level (t-statistic = 2.19). The coefficient on CPS × High CEO succes-
sion planning importance (b3) is positive. A formal test rejects the null hypothesis
that b0+b3=0 at the 1% level (F-statistic= 7.98, p-value= 0.005). The result sug-
gests a highly significant and positive association between CPS and COC in firms
in which CEO succession planning is highly important. In terms of the economic
significance, the results suggest that an increase in CPS from the 10th percentile
to the 90th percentile is associated with an increase in the cost of equity of 21.6 bp
((0.494 + 0.412)×(0.511−0.237)), which is equivalent to a difference of 4.32%
(21.6 bp/5.00%) in firm value for firms with high CEO succession planning im-
portance. In contrast, the coefficient on CPS × Low CEO succession planning
importance (b4) is negative, and the null hypothesis that b0 + b4 = 0 cannot be re-
jected at the 10% level (F-statistic = 0.14, p-value = 0.713). The result suggests
that investors do not demand a higher risk premium for firms with a larger CPS
when CEO succession planning is of little importance to the firms.
The difference in the coefficient on CPS between the group of firms with
high (b3) and the group of firms with low CEO succession planning importance
(b4) is marginally significant (F-statistic = 2.70, p-value = 0.10). Turning to the
economic significance, when a firm increases its emphasis on CEO succession
planning importance from the low group to the high group, the increase in the cost
of equity associated with an increase in CPS from the 10th percentile to the 90th
percentile is 18.45 bp ((0.412 + 0.363)× (0.511− 0.237)), which is equivalent
to a difference of 3.69% (18.45 bp/5.00%) in firm value. To summarize, the evi-
dence is again consistent with the managerial power hypothesis but inconsistent
with the tournament hypothesis regarding the succession risk associated with CPS
(Hypothesis 4).
C. Additional Analysis
A question that follows naturally from the above two findings is whether
they capture the same effects. For example, perhaps a firm with higher free cash
flow is more likely to become an acquisition target and the incumbent CEO is
expected to be fired after takeover. To answer this question, we first investigate
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whether the partitions based on Residual CF and Residual Q and those based
on PrLEAVE and HOMOG overlap. The results suggest that they do not overlap
much.13 Column 3 in Table 7 formally investigates this issue by allowing CPS to
interact with all 4 indicator variables. We find that the results are similar to those
obtained in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7. The difference between the coefficient
on CPS × High free cash flow (b1) and that on CPS × Low free cash flow (b2)
continues to be significant at the 10% level (F-statistic = 3.54, p-value = 0.060).
The coefficient on CPS × High CEO succession planning importance (b3) is also
marginally higher than the coefficient on CPS × Low CEO succession planning
importance (b4) (F-statistic= 2.69, p-value= 0.101). As a further test, we repeat
the above but drop the observations falling in the intersection of the High free
cash flow portfolio and the High CEO succession planning importance portfolio
(303 observations) and the intersection of the Low free cash flow portfolio and
the Low CEO succession planning importance portfolio (257 observations). The
results (unreported) are qualitatively similar.
To summarize, the results in Table 7 further support the hypothesis that
shareholders view a large executive pay disparity as a symptom of CEO entrench-
ment. In particular, the results suggest that shareholders demand compensation
for opportunistic behavior such as overinvestment and empire building during the
incumbent CEO’s tenure (Hypothesis 3), and for poor CEO succession planning,
which results in high succession risk (Hypothesis 4). In addition, the findings
documented in Table 7 further alleviate the concern of correlated omitted
variables.
VI. CPS, Corporate Governance, and the Cost of Equity
Prior studies find that poor corporate governance increases the cost of equity
(Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006), Hail and Leuz (2006), (2009),
and Chen et al. (2011)) and that executive pay disparity is associated with charac-
teristics that are indicative of poor corporate governance (Bebchuk et al. (2011)).
A natural question that arises is whether executive pay disparity conveys incre-
mental information about CEO entrenchment or CEO succession risk after con-
trolling for other corporate governance mechanisms. We address this question
through a 2-step approach. In the 1st step, we regress executive pay disparity
against a series of corporate governance variables. We then decompose executive
pay disparity into the predicted and the residual components. By construction, the
residual component is more likely to capture information about CEO entrench-
ment or poor succession planning not captured by those governance variables
13Specifically, 21.2% of the observations in the portfolio associated with the most severe agency
problem of free cash flow are also grouped into the portfolio associated with high succession planning
importance, and 18.6% of the observations in the portfolio associated with the least severe agency
problem of free cash flow are also grouped into the portfolio associated with low succession planning
importance. Only 9.8% of the observations in the portfolio associated with low succession planning
importance are grouped into the portfolio associated with the least severe agency problem of free cash
flow, and only 11.9% of the observations in the portfolio associated with high succession planning
importance are grouped into the portfolio associated with the most severe agency problem of free
cash flow.
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used in the 1st-stage regression. In particular, we employ the following 14 gov-
ernance variables: the E-index (Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Bebchuk, Cohen,
and Ferrell (2009)),14 accounting information quality (Francis et al. (2004)),15
a dummy variable to indicate whether the chairman is also the CEO, board size
(Yermack (1996)), board independence, existence of a compensation committee,
size of the compensation committee, independence of the compensation com-
mittee, existence of an audit committee, size of the audit committee, indepen-
dence of the audit committee (Klein (2002)), institutional ownership (Gillan and
Starks (2000)), CEO ownership, and ownership by directors other than the CEO
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)). In the 2nd stage, we regress the cost of
equity against the predicted pay disparity and the residual pay disparity.16
A. The Main Effect of the Residual CPS
The results are reported in Table 8. Panel A of Table 8 repeats our anal-
ysis in Table 4 using residual CPS and predicted CPS. Due to additional data
requirement, the sample size is reduced to 5,832 firm-year observations. Col-
umn 1 in Panel A includes only predicted CPS. Consistent with prior literature
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Hail and Leuz (2006), (2009), and Chen et al.
(2011)), the predicted pay disparity is positively associated with the cost of equity
and is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic= 3.03). Column 2 in Panel A includes
only residual CPS. The coefficient on residual CPS is 0.451, which is significant
at the 5% level (t-statistic = 1.98). Finally, column 3 in Panel A includes both
predicted CPS and residual CPS in the regression. As expected, since the 2 com-
ponents of CPS are orthogonal to each other, the coefficients of predicted CPS and
residual CPS are very close to those in the first 2 models.17 In terms of economic
significance, based on the results in column 3, an increase in predicted CPS of
14We also use the G-index constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) in a robustness test
and find similar results.
15We use the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to measure accounting information quality.
Specifically, for each year and each industry defined by Fama and French (1997), we estimate a
cross-sectional regression of working capital accrual on operating cash flow in the prior, current,
and subsequent years. Accounting information quality is measured as the absolute value of the resid-
ual from the regression, multiplied by −1. We use the absolute value of the residual to maximize
sample size. We also use the standard deviation of the residuals over the previous 4 years to measure
accounting information quality. The results are similar.
16An alternative way to examine whether CPS is subsumed by governance or whether CPS sub-
stitutes for or complements a governance measure in influencing the cost of capital is to include both
CPS and the governance measure plus their interaction term in a regression. Based on this approach,
Bebchuk et al. (2011) find a significantly negative association between firm value and CPS when share-
holder rights (proxied by the E-index (Bebchuk et al. (2009)) are weak but not when they are strong.
Consistent with their findings, we also find that the association between CPS and the cost of equity
is significantly positive only when the E-index is above the sample median (i.e., when shareholder
rights are weak) but not when it is below. In addition, we find a similar result when board indepen-
dence is used to proxy for corporate governance. These findings suggest that CPS is complementary
to both external (i.e., the E-index) and internal (i.e., board independence) governance mechanisms in
influencing the cost of equity. The results are available from the authors.
17We also estimate regression (1) using the reduced sample. The coefficient on CPS is 0.631 with
a t-statistic of 2.81 (unreported).
874 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
1 standard deviation (0.036, unreported) is associated with an increase in the cost
of equity of 9.9 (2.749 × 0.036) bp. An increase in residual CPS of 1 standard
deviation (0.114, unreported) is associated with an increase in the cost of equity
of 5.4 (0.473 × 0.114) bp. Thus, while the 14 governance-related variables men-
tioned above have captured a significant portion of the variation in CPS associated
with the cost of equity, the results are also consistent with the notion that CPS
captures incremental information about CEO entrenchment and CEO succession
risk.
B. The Conditioning Effects of the Residual CPS
Panel B of Table 8 repeats the analysis in Table 7 by replacing CPS with
residual CPS. Column 1 of Panel B interacts residual CPS with the 2 indicators
of the severity of the agency problem of free cash flow, and column 2 interacts
TABLE 8
Residual CPS and the Cost of Equity
Table 8 reports the results of regression of the cost of capital (COC) on predicted and residual CPS. Predicted and residual
CPS are the predicted and the residual values of CPS regressed on a set of governance variables: the E-index, accounting
information quality, a dummy variable indicating whether the chairman is also the CEO, board size, board independence,
the existence of a compensation committee, size of the compensation committee, the independence of the compensation
committee, the existence of an audit committee, size of the audit committee, the independence of the audit committee,
institutional ownership, CEO ownership, and ownership by directors other than the CEO. BETA is the systematic risk,
IRISK is the idiosyncratic risk, LogMV is the ﬁrm size, LogBM is the book-to-market ratio, LEV is the leverage ratio, MMT
is the momentum return, FERR is the analysts’ forecast error, and FLTG is the analysts’ forecasted long-term growth rate.
High free cash ﬂow (Low free cash ﬂow) is a dummy variable for ﬁrms with above (below) median residual cash ﬂow
and below (above) median residual Tobin’s Q. High CEO succession planning importance (Low CEO succession plan-
ning importance) is a dummy variable for ﬁrms with above (below) median CEO leaving probability (PrLEAVE) and below
(above) median industry homogeneity (HOMOG). See the Appendix for detailed variable deﬁnitions. The t-statistics are in
parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the ﬁrm level. *, **, and
*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. The Main Effect of the Residual CPS
Independent Variable 1 2 3
Predicted CPS 2.699*** 2.749***
(3.03) (3.08)
Residual CPS 0.451** 0.473**
(1.98) (2.08)
Market beta (BETA) −0.127** −0.134** −0.127**
(−2.17) (−2.30) (−2.16)
Idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK) 0.032 0.031 0.033
(0.91) (0.89) (0.94)
Firm size (LogMV) −0.284*** −0.272*** −0.286***
(−9.49) (−9.34) (−9.53)
Book-to-market (LogBM) 1.491*** 1.496*** 1.492***
(17.94) (17.96) (18.00)
Leverage (LEV) 1.501*** 1.575*** 1.495***
(6.14) (6.47) (6.12)
Price momentum (MMT) −1.008*** −1.010*** −1.010***
(−13.89) (−13.88) (−13.91)
Analyst forecast error (FERR) −0.109*** −0.109*** −0.109***
(−12.19) (−12.12) (−12.20)
Long-term growth rate (FLTG) 0.009** 0.008** 0.009***
(2.55) (2.40) (2.62)
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.583 0.583 0.584
No. of ﬁrm-year obs. 5,832 5,832 5,832
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 8 (continued)
Residual CPS and the Cost of Equity
Panel B. The Cross-Sectional Variation in the Effect of the Residual CPS on the COC
Independent Variable Coefﬁcient 1 2 3
High free cash ﬂow 0.274*** 0.270***
(3.79) (3.74)
Low free cash ﬂow −0.623*** −0.619***
(−7.83) (−7.79)
High CEO succession planning importance −0.063 −0.063
(−1.05) (−1.06)
Low CEO succession planning importance 0.104* 0.088
(1.67) (1.44)
Residual CPS b0 0.575** 0.283 0.411
(2.19) (0.91) (1.20)
Residual CPS× High free cash ﬂow b1 0.978 1.014
(1.44) (1.51)
Residual CPS× Low free cash ﬂow b2 −0.379 −0.408
(−0.70) (−0.75)
Residual CPS× High CEO succession planning importance b3 0.823* 0.721
(1.67) (1.49)
Residual CPS× Low CEO succession planning importance b4 −0.183 −0.282
(−0.34) (−0.53)
Market beta (BETA) −0.098* −0.137** −0.095*
(−1.73) (−2.39) (−1.67)
Idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK) 0.066** 0.049 0.068**
(1.96) (1.40) (2.01)
Firm size (LogMV) −0.251*** −0.255*** −0.245***
(−8.93) (−8.67) (−8.53)
Book-to-market (LogBM) 1.470*** 1.533*** 1.481***
(19.39) (19.57) (19.20)
Leverage (LEV) 1.657*** 1.536*** 1.666***
(6.82) (6.22) (6.85)
Price momentum (MMT) −1.003*** −1.054*** −1.025***
(−13.96) (−14.63) (−14.32)
Analyst forecast error (FERR) −0.107*** −0.105*** −0.106***
(−11.84) (−11.53) (−11.82)
Long-term growth rate (FLTG) 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.011***
(3.11) (2.53) (3.09)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.596 0.589 0.596
No. of ﬁrm-year obs. 5,639 5,639 5,639
F-Statistic
(p-value)
Hypothesis Testing:
Null Hypothesis 1 2 3
Residual CPS + Residual CPS × High free cash ﬂow = 0 (b0 + b1 = 0) 5.95 4.75
(0.015) (0.030)
Residual CPS + Residual CPS × Low free cash ﬂow = 0 (b0 + b2 = 0) 0.15 0.00
(0.698) (0.995)
Residual CPS × Low free cash ﬂow = Residual CPS× 2.71 3.03
High free cash ﬂow (b1 = b2) (0.100) (0.082)
Residual CPS + Residual CPS × High CEO succession planning 7.89 7.79
importance = 0 (b0 + b3 = 0) (0.005) (0.005)
Residual CPS + Residual CPS × Low CEO succession planning 0.04 0.07
importance = 0 (b0 + b4 = 0) (0.835) (0.786)
Residual CPS × Low CEO succession planning importance = Residual 2.66 2.74
CPS× High CEO succession planning importance (b3 = b4) (0.103) (0.098)
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residual CPS with the 2 indicators of the importance of CEO succession planning.
In column 3, residual CPS is interacted with all 4 indicators. Since the results
from columns 1 and 2 are consistent with those from column 3, we focus our
discussions on the results from column 3 only. The coefficient on residual CPS
(b0) is positive but insignificant (t-statistic = 1.20). The results from column 3
also show a positive coefficient on residual CPS × High free cash flow (b1) and
a negative coefficient on residual CPS × Low free cash flow (b2). Formal tests
reject the null hypothesis that b0 + b1 = 0 at the 5% level (F-statistic = 4.75,
p-value = 0.030) but cannot reject the null hypothesis that b0 + b2 = 0 at the 10%
level (F-statistic = 0.00, p-value = 0.995). In addition, the difference between
b1 and b2 is significant at the 10% level (F-statistic = 3.03, p-value = 0.082),
which is in line with the results in Table 7. Also consistent with the results in
Table 7, the coefficient on residual CPS× High CEO succession planning impor-
tance (b3) is positive and the coefficient on residual CPS × Low CEO succession
planning importance (b4) is negative. The null hypothesis that b0 + b3 = 0 is
rejected at the 1% level (F-statistic = 7.79, p-value = 0.005). But the null hy-
pothesis that b0 + b4 = 0 cannot be rejected at the 10% level (F-statistic = 0.07,
p-value= 0.786). The difference between b3 and b4 is significant at the 10% level
(F-statistic = 2.74, p-value = 0.098). The evidence provides further support for
the hypothesis that CPS captures additional information about CEO entrenchment
and CEO succession planning.
VII. CPS and the Change in Stock Return Volatility around
a CEO Turnover
To further substantiate the succession risk hypothesis, we examine the as-
sociation between the uncertainty surrounding a CEO turnover event and CPS
before the turnover. We measure the uncertainty driven by the CEO turnover as
the change in stock return volatility around the CEO turnover event. If a large
CPS indicates poor CEO succession planning and high succession risk, we would
expect the increase in stock return volatility around CEO turnover to be positively
associated with CEO pay disparity before the CEO turnover. A small internal
CEO candidate pool may force the board of directors to look elsewhere for a
CEO successor. Since there is more uncertainty in the strategies and the ability of
an external CEO successor, the change in volatility would be higher. Furthermore,
even if the board chooses an internal candidate, if this candidate has low ability
or little experience in handling the work of a CEO, he will face a steep learning
curve. These 2 forces will both lead to higher uncertainty around a CEO turnover
event.
We identify CEO turnovers based on information in ExecuComp. In par-
ticular, we first identify all fiscal years in which the CEO in the current year is
different from the CEO in the previous year for a firm. When there is insufficient
information in ExecuComp to identify the CEO in the current or previous year,
we search 10-K forms and proxy statements in the EDGAR database and exclude
those observations involving no CEO turnover. We then estimate the following
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regression to investigate the effect of pay disparity on the change in return volatil-
ity around a CEO turnover:
ΔVOLi,t+N = α + b1CPSi,t−1 + b2ΔVOLMKT,t+N + b3ΔVOLM1,t+N(3)
+ b4ΔVOLM2,t+N + b5IndQi,t−1 + b6ROAi,t−1
+ b7ΔROAi,t+N + Year Fixed Effects + εi,t.
The dependent variable, ΔVOLi,t+N , is the change in stock return volatility
from year t− 1 to year t + N (for N = 1, 2, or 3), where year t is the fiscal year in
which the incumbent CEO stepped down. We also use year t − 2 as a benchmark
and obtain similar results (unreported). We estimate stock return volatility as the
standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year. We require the in-
cumbent CEO to have served the firm for the complete year t−2 and year t−1. We
also require the successor CEO to have been in the CEO position from year t to
year t+N. Pay disparity is measured at year t−1. Following Clayton et al. (2005),
we control for the change in market return volatility (ΔVOLMKT,t+N), the change
in volatility of 2 sets of matched firms (ΔVOLM1,t+N and ΔVOLM2,t+N), industry
Tobin’s Q (IndQ), and accounting performance (ROA) before the CEO turnover in
the regression. Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that CPS is negatively associated with
future performance, and performance is negatively associated with return volatil-
ity (Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2004)). Therefore, we further control for the
change in performance, ΔROAi,t+N , in the regression. Finally, we further control
for the year fixed effects as it tends to increase with CPS. Here, ΔVOLMKT,t+N is
the change in volatility of value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ daily returns
over the same period.
The 2 sets of matched firms are constructed as follows: The 1st set of matched
firms (M1) is constructed based on firm size and the change in return volatility
from year t− 2 to year t− 1. The 2nd set of matched firms (M2) is based on firm
size and the stock returns in year t − 2 and year t − 1. In particular, for each firm
with a CEO turnover, we first identify all firms whose total assets fall between
90% and 110% of the total assets of the firm with a CEO turnover in year t − 1
and eliminate the firms with a CEO turnover in any year between t and t + N. Next,
for each firm with a CEO turnover, we select the firm with the closest change in
return volatility from year t− 2 to year t− 1 to construct the 1st matched sample
and the firm with the closest compound return from year t − 2 to year t − 1 to
construct the 2nd matched sample.
Table 9 gives the regression results. We find that in general the evidence is
consistent with our hypothesis that a larger CPS is associated with greater un-
certainty around a CEO turnover. The association between the change in return
volatility in year t + 1 and CPS in year t − 1 is positive and significant at the
5% level (t-statistic = 2.36). The change in return volatility in year t + 2 is also
positively and significantly associated with CPS in year t − 1 (t-statistic = 1.98).
The increase in volatility in year t + 3 is again positively associated with CPS
(t-statistic = 2.09), and the magnitude of the coefficient (0.009) is very close to
those in columns 1 and 2. The signs of the control variables are in general con-
sistent with those of Clayton et al. (2005). As a whole, the evidence suggests that
a large CPS is associated with an increase in uncertainty around a CEO turnover
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event, consistent with the notion that a large CPS is associated with poor CEO
succession planning and thus high CEO succession risk. Our finding appears to
be consistent with the evidence given by Bebchuk et al. (2011) that a larger CPS
is associated with lower sensitivity of a CEO turnover to performance.
TABLE 9
CPS and the Change in Volatility around CEO Turnovers
Table 9 reports the results of the change in return volatility (ΔVOLi,t+N) around a CEO turnover regressed on executive
pay slice (CPS). Here,ΔVOLi,t+N is the change in stock return volatility of ﬁrm i from year t− 1 to year t + N, where year
t is the ﬁscal year of the CEO turnover, and return volatility is measured as the standard deviation of daily returns over
the ﬁscal year; ΔVOLMKT,t+N is the change in volatility of market returns from year t − 1 to year t + N; ΔVOLM1,t+N is
the change in return volatility from year t − 1 to year t + N of the ﬁrm matched with a CEO turnover ﬁrm with similar size
and a similar change in return volatility in the pre-turnover period; ΔVOLM2,t + N is the change in volatility from year t− 1
to year t + N of the ﬁrm matched with a CEO turnover ﬁrm with similar size and similar stock returns in the pre-turnover
period; IndQ is the median Tobin’s Q of all ﬁrms in the same industry as deﬁned by Fama and French (1997); ROA is the
return on assets, deﬁned as income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets; and ΔROAi,t+N is the change in
ROA between year t + N and year t− 1. The t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for
clustering at the ﬁrm level. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable =ΔVOLi,t+N
Independent Variable N = 1 N = 2 N = 3
CPSi,t−1 0.007** 0.007** 0.009**
(2.36) (1.98) (2.09)
Change in market return volatility (ΔVOLMKT,t+N) 1.255*** 0.939*** 1.387***
(5.04) (5.32) (7.76)
Change in volatility of ﬁrms matched on size 0.110** 0.099** 0.035
and pre-turnover volatility (ΔVOLM1,t+N) (2.35) (2.33) (0.60)
Change in volatility of ﬁrms matched on size 0.069 0.018 0.035
and pre-turnover returns (ΔVOLM2,t+N) (1.31) (0.47) (0.56)
Industry Tobin’s Q (IndQt−1) −0.002 −0.002* −0.006***
(−1.62) (−1.74) (−4.13)
Return on asset (ROAi,t−1) −0.017*** −0.004 −0.009
(−3.37) (−0.96) (−1.52)
Change in return on assets (ΔROAi,t+N) −0.012*** −0.011*** −0.021***
(−3.11) (−3.74) (−3.52)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.301 0.488 0.603
No. of ﬁrm-year obs. 1,089 846 638
VIII. Conclusions
We find a significant and positive association between executive pay
disparity and the ex ante cost of equity capital implied in stock prices and an-
alysts’ earnings forecasts. The association is robust to alternative model spec-
ifications, estimates of cost of equity, and proxies for executive pay disparity.
A series of robustness tests suggest that the positive association is not likely
due to biases associated with the endogeneity of executive pay disparity. Fur-
thermore, the positive association is more pronounced the higher the level of
severity of the agency problem of free cash flow faced by the firm. The posi-
tive association is also more pronounced the more likely the incumbent CEO is
to leave in the near future and the more difficult it is to find a suitable succes-
sor. These findings also hold even when residual executive pay disparity is used
in the analysis, where the residual comes from a regression of pay disparity on
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14 corporate governance-related variables that potentially affect the cost of eq-
uity. Finally, a larger change in stock return volatility around CEO turnover events
is also associated with a larger executive pay disparity before CEO turnovers. In
sum, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that shareholders view a large
pay disparity as a symptom of CEO entrenchment, which implies not only more
opportunistic behavior during his tenure but also higher succession risk when he
leaves.
We make several contributions to the emerging literature on executive pay
disparity. First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide large
sample evidence on the association between executive pay disparity and the cost
of equity. Our results are consistent with those of Bebchuk et al. (2011), but are
inconsistent with those of Kale et al. (2009). In particular, Bebchuk et al. (2011)
find that executive pay disparity is associated with lower firm value and lower fu-
ture cash flows. We complement their study by showing that investors also charge
a higher discount rate for firms with a large pay disparity and that a significant
portion of the firm valuation effect attributable to executive pay disparity as docu-
mented by them is in fact due to the cost of equity effect. Our study is also related
to that of Cooper et al. (2009), who find a negative relation between executive pay
and future realized returns. Their study suggests that investors do not fully incor-
porate the information implied in executive pay into stock prices. We show that
investors do realize that excessive CEO pay relative to the pay of other senior ex-
ecutives can be a symptom of CEO entrenchment and an indication of succession
risk. In other words, investors do incorporate this information into their resource
allocation decisions.
Second, our study enhances our understanding of the implications of ex-
ecutive pay disparity. Bebchuk et al. (2011) provide evidence that a large ex-
ecutive pay disparity is associated with various opportunistic behavior of the
CEO during his tenure. Consistent with their findings, our study indicates that
shareholders discount the cash flow of firms with a large executive pay disparity
more when the agency problem of free cash flow is more severe. Furthermore,
our results suggest that a large executive pay disparity is associated with poor
CEO succession planning and high succession risk, which is also incorporated
into shareholders’ resource allocation decisions. Our evidence suggests that poor
CEO succession planning and high succession risk can explain the findings of
Bebchuk et al. (2011) that the incumbent CEO is less likely to be replaced for poor
performance.
Finally, our paper also contributes to our understanding of the determinants
of the cost of equity, a key variable in a firm’s financing and capital budgeting
decisions. Our paper is related to recent studies on the effect of corporate gov-
ernance on the cost of equity in general (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Hail
and Leuz (2006), (2009), and Chen et al. (2009), (2011)). In particular, we find
that executive pay disparity is positively associated with the cost of equity even
after controlling for the influence of governance-related variables on CEO pay
disparity. This evidence is also in line with the notion that executive pay dispar-
ity captures additional information beyond the agency problem (Bebchuk et al.
(2011)).
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Appendix. Variable Definitions
COC. The cost of equity capital estimated following Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Pa´stor
et al. (2008) minus the risk-free rate measured as the yield on the 10-year Treasury bonds.
Specifically, the implied cost of equity capital is the internal rate of return (R) in the fol-
lowing equation:
P∗t = Bt +
T−1∑
i=1
(FROEt+i − R)× Bt+i−1
(1 + R)i
+
(FROEt+T − R)× Bt+T−1
(1 + R)T−1R
.(A-1)
We use IBES analysts’ earnings per share forecasts (FEPS) to proxy for the market ex-
pectations of a firm’s earnings for the next 3 years. We measure FEPS by assuming that
the future return on equity (FROE) declines linearly until it reaches an equilibrium ROE,
which carries on from the 4th year to the T-th year. This equilibrium ROE is measured by
a historical, 10-year, industry-specific median return on equity. The ROE is calculated as
the income available to common shareholders (#IBCOM)18 scaled by the lagged total book
value of equity (#CEQ). We classify all firms into the 48 industries defined by Fama and
French (1997). Following Gebhardt et al. (2001), firm-year observations with a negative
ROE are excluded from our sample. The future book value of equity (B) is estimated by
assuming a clean surplus relation. We follow Gebhardt et al. and assume T = 12. To make
sure that the cost of equity estimate is based on information available to the investors,
we estimate the cost of capital at month +4 after the fiscal year-end. To account for par-
tial year discounting, we adjust the stock price at month +4 (Pt) by (1 + R)4/12, that is,
P∗t = Pt/(1 + R)4/12(Hail and Leuz (2006)).
COCES,F (COCES,C). Cost of equity estimated following Easton and Sommers (2007). In
each year, firms are sorted into 10 equal-sized portfolios based on CPS defined below. The
Easton and Sommers cost of equity estimate is based on future realized earnings. RES,F , is
based on the regression
EPSt+1
Bt
= γ0 + γ1
Pt
Bt
+ μt, and RES,F = γ0 + γ1,(A-2)
where EPSt+1 is earnings per share (#IB divided by #CSHO, adjusted for stock splits) of
year t + 1, Bt is the book value of equity per share (#CEQ divided by #CSHO, adjusted
for stock splits) at the end of year t, and Pt is the stock price (#PRCC F, adjusted for stock
splits) at the end of year t. The Easton and Sommers cost of equity estimate based on
current realized earnings, RES,C, is based on the regression
EPSt
Bt−1
= δ0 + δ1
Pt − Bt
Bt−1
+ εt, and RES,C = δ0,(A-3)
where EPSt is realized earnings per share of year t; Bt−1 is the book value of equity per
share of year t − 1; Bt is the adjusted book value per share at the end of year t, defined
as #CEQ of year t minus #NI of year t, plus #IB of year t, and scaled by #CSHO of year
t (adjusted for split); and Pt is the stock price at the end of year t. COCES,F (COCES,C)
is defined as RES,F (RES,C) minus the risk-free rate.
COCVL. The Value Line cost of equity (COCVL), estimated following Brav, Lehavy, and
Michaely (2005), is defined as R minus the risk-free rate. R solves the equation
(1 + R)4 = TPt+5
Pt
+
DIVt+1
[
(1+R)4−(1+g)4
R−g
]
Pt
,(A-4)
18Here, # refers to the Compustat annual data item.
Chen, Huang, and Wei 881
where DIVt is dividends per share for the next 12 months, g is the forecasted dividends
growth rate, and TPt+5 is the average forecasted target price.
CPS. CEO pay slice, measured as a CEO’s total pay (ExecuComp item TDC1) divided
by the sum of the total pay of the top 5 executives. The observation is deleted when a CEO
has not served for a complete fiscal year, or if ExecuComp does not have total pay data for
at least 5 executives.
Residual CPS. Residual from the annual regression of CPS against the following vari-
ables: the E-index, accounting information quality, a dummy variable to indicate whether
the chairman is also the CEO, board size, board independence, existence of a compensa-
tion committee, size of the compensation committee, independence of the compensation
committee, existence of an audit committee, size of the audit committee, independence of
the audit committee, institutional ownership, CEO ownership, and ownership by directors
other than the CEO.
PAYGAP. Natural logarithm of the difference between the total pay of the CEO and the
median total pay among the other top 4 executives.
GINI TOP4 (GINI TOP5). Gini coefficient based on the total pay among the top 4 (5)
executives, defined as
1 + 1
n
− 2
n2z¯
n∑
i=1
(i · zi),
where n= 4 (5) is the number of executives excluding (including) the CEO for GINI TOP4
(GINI TOP5); z1, z2, z3, z4, and z5 are the total pay awarded to each of the n executives in
descending order; and z¯ is the mean total compensation awarded to the n executives.
CV TOP5. Coefficient of variation based on the total pay among the top 5 executives.
Measured as the standard deviation of the total pay awarded to each of the top 5 executives
divided by the mean of the total pay awarded to each of the top 5 executives.
BETA. Beta, estimated for each firm-year observation by regressing monthly returns on
the value-weighted market returns of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ. Sixty (with a minimum of
24) monthly observations before the month at which the cost of capital is computed are
used in the regression.
IRISK. Idiosyncratic risk, measured as the standard deviation of the residuals from the
above regression used to estimate BETA.
LogMV. Natural logarithm of the market value of equity (#PRCC F × #CSHO), mea-
sured at the most recent fiscal year-end.
LogBM. Natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity (#CEQ) to the market
value of equity (#PRCC F × #CSHO), both measured at the most recent fiscal year-end.
LEV. Book leverage, measured as the book value of total long-term debt (#DLTT) divided
by the book value of total assets (#AT), both measured at the most recent fiscal year-end.
MMT. Natural logarithm of the compounded returns over the 12 months before the month
at which the cost of equity is computed.
FERR. Analysts’ forecast error of the forthcoming annual earnings, defined as actual
EPS from IBES minus the analysts’ forecasted EPS used to compute the cost of equity,
scaled by the price in the month at which the cost of equity is computed. When the IBES
actual EPS is missing, actual EPS from Compustat is used instead.
FLTG. Analysts’ forecast of the long-term growth rate. If missing, it is defined as FY3/
FY2, where FY3 and FY2 are analysts’ forecasts of earnings in years t + 3 and t + 2. The
value of FY2 is required to be positive in the calculation.
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RQ. Residual value of the regression of Tobin’s Q against CPS. Tobin’s Q is defined as
the market value of equity (#PRCC F × #CSHO) minus the book value of equity (#CEQ)
plus the book value of total assets (#AT), scaled by the book value of total assets (#AT).
All variables are measured at the most recent fiscal year-end.
RCF. Residual value of the regression of operating cash flow against CPS. Operating cash
flow is defined as income before extraordinary items (#IB) plus depreciation (#DP), scaled
by the book value of total assets (#AT). All variables are measured at the most recent fiscal
year-end.
PrLEAVE. Probability of the CEO leaving in the next 3 years, estimated as follows: First,
for each year t, we estimate a logit model to predict CEO turnover in the next 3 years. We
include the following variables as the predictors: the level of and change in ROA, current
and lagged market-adjusted stock returns, volatility of ROA, systematic volatility and id-
iosyncratic volatility of stock returns, firm size, a CEO age dummy variable indicating if
the age of the incumbent CEO is greater than or equal to 60, and the change in institutional
holdings. All of the predictors are measured at year t. Second, for each year t, we use the
predictors measured at year t and the coefficient estimates from the model estimated in
year t − 3 to construct an ex ante measure of the CEO leaving probability (PrLEAVE) in
years t + 1 to t + 3.
HOMOG. Industry homogeneity. In each year, a partial correlation between a firm’s re-
turns and the industry returns, controlling for the market returns, is computed for each firm
using monthly returns over the previous 60 months (with a minimum of 24 months) until
the fiscal year-end. Industry homogeneity is defined as the mean partial correlation of all
firms in the same industry. The industries are defined by Fama and French (1997).
ΔVOLi,t+N . Change in stock return volatility of firm i from year t−1 to year t + N, where
year t is the fiscal year of the CEO turnover. Return volatility is measured as the standard
deviation of daily returns over the fiscal year.
ΔVOLMKT,t+N . Change in volatility of market returns from year t − 1 to year t + N.
ΔVOLM1,t+N . Change in return volatility from year t−1 to year t + N of the firm matched
with a CEO turnover firm of similar size and a similar change in return volatility in the
pre-turnover period.
ΔVOLM2,t+N . Change in return volatility from year t − 1 to year t + N of the firm
matched with a CEO turnover firm of similar size and similar stock returns in the pre-
turnover period.
IndQ. Median Tobin’s Q of all firms in the same industry as defined by Fama and French
(1997).
ROA. Return on assets, defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by total
assets.
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